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Yuen Yuen AngThe spread of the Internet and new communication technologies has opened a new and
potent avenue for contention in authoritarian regimes. Thus far, the study of authoritarian
restraints on online activism has centered on direct measures of state control—primarily
regulation, censorship, and repression.1 Despite a surge of attention to online activism,2
however, there has been scant analysis of the forms and origins of internal organizational
problems among politically active cyber-communities in non-democratic societies. How
do netizens organize and behave in authoritarian China compared to their counterparts
in democracies?3 What does online behavior in China suggest about the limits of online
activism under authoritarian rule?
This essay provides a rare comparative study of online political participation in
two contrasting political regimes: China and India. Focusing on I-Paid-A-Bribe
(IPAB), a crowd-sourcing platform for reporting incidents of bribery anonymously,
I examine why this site originated and thrived in India, whereas a bottom-up copycat
effort in China fizzled out only months after it emerged. Through a comparative
exercise, I look beyond the direct suppression of online activism by authoritarian
states. I highlight instead the extended and often inadvertent effects of authoritarian rule
in weakening the ability of netizens to self-govern and constructively engage the state.
The transplantation of IPAB from India to China presents a unique analytic oppor-
tunity to cast in sharp relief the distinctive features of online state-society interactions
in authoritarian China. In 2008, The Janaagraha Centre, based in India, founded the
I-Paid-A-Bribe website, which mobilizes citizens to anonymously report encounters with
bribe extraction.4 Using these reports, the Centre tracks patterns of bribery and recom-
mends anti-corruption measures to the government. Following its popular reception in
India, spin-offs of IPAB spread to other countries, including China.5 During the summer
of 2011, replicas of IPAB sprang up across Chinese cyberspace, igniting enthusiasm in
the online community. However, the spontaneous movement was short-lived. Only
months after the appearance of these sites, most were forcibly or voluntarily closed.21
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sion of free expression in an authoritarian state.6 It is widely assumed that the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) viewed citizens’ online reports of corruption as threatening
and would therefore seek to shut down IPAB sites as soon as they appeared. These
opinions surfaced throughout media and scholarly reports:22In the networked authoritarian state, there is no guarantee of individual rights and
freedoms. Those whom the rulers see as threats are jailed.7
The Chinese experiment is doomed to fail because the country lacks the environment
in which the Indian anti-bribery platform … operates and thrives: an open, democratic
ecosystem that protects free speech.8
They are threatening enough that when a rash of similar sites popped up in China
last summer, the government stamped them out within a couple of weeks, contending
they had failed to register with the authorities.9As we will see, however, the assumption that IPAB failed in China as a result
of authoritarian intolerance and the suppression of corruption reports is partial and
even inaccurate. By tracing the spread and demise of IPAB in China and comparing
it to the dynamics in India, I draw two counter-observations. First, Chinese state
authorities did not clamp down on IPAB immediately or resolutely. Instead, their
responses vacillated between approval and suppression. Furthermore, consistent with
the model of “fragmented authoritarianism,” state responses appeared divided across
ministries and levels of government.10 Second, even before the Chinese portals were
officially closed down, they were plagued by internal problems of organization, includ-
ing mismanagement, opportunism, and narrow goals of anti-corruption, which were
comparatively absent in India.
The organizational problems seen in China’s IPAB sites do not suggest that
Chinese netizens are intrinsically deficient. Rather, I argue, they may be traced to
prolonged restrictions placed against autonomous non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and free association under non-democratic rule. China lacks autonomous
and professional NGOs that can channel online activism into constructive policy
engagement and public education. The equivalent of India’s Janaagraha Centre, an
NGO dedicated to monitoring government, is not permitted in China.11 In the absence
of professional and autonomous organizers, the underlying lack of experience with
and knowledge about constructive norms of civic engagement among netizens is left
unfiltered and exposed. For these reasons, we see instances of venting, personal
vengeance, and profiteering through IPAB in China. Furthermore, an analysis of
web content reveals a striking lack of appreciation among Chinese netizens of the
original mission of IPAB in combating petty corruption as a systemic problem. Instead,
the focus of China’s IPAB was on exposing and arresting corrupt individuals, echoing
the state’s own rhetoric of corruption as a problem of bad agents, rather than of struc-
tural political and economic factors.12
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it is not sufficient to examine the external shackles imposed on citizens. That is one
significant form of restraint, but it is not the only form. It is equally important to look
to such issues as the motivation for and quality of online participation in politics.
Authoritarian rule provides an inhospitable environment for nurturing online citizen-
ship in the full sense of the word, involving not only the exercise of rights and free
speech, but also accountability, responsibility, and trust.13 The Internet has played a
positive role in freeing political expression in China; however, it is emphasized that
both the core obligations of citizenship and the constructive norms of public partici-
pation and debate are still being learned.14The Rise and Spread of IPAB in India
The original I-Paid-A-Bribe website (www.ipaidabribe.com) was founded in India, in 2008,
by the Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, a non-profit organization (NPO)
based in Bangalore. The goal of the initiative was “to tackle corruption by harnessing the
collective energy of citizens.” It called on citizens to anonymously report incidents and
amounts of bribe-giving, with a focus on everyday forms of petty or “retail” corruption,
such as bribes paid to obtain birth certificates or driving licenses. The site also enables
citizens to report instances when they successfully resisted paying bribes and when they
meet honest officials who did not ask for bribes. As of January 2013, over 1.6 million
people have visited the site. By May 2012, over 17,000 bribe reports were made.15
The two main goals of IPAB are procedural reforms and public education. The
website (1) recommends changes in the way approvals or public services are delivered
in order to reduce opportunities for petty bribery and (2) educates citizens about their
legal entitlement to public services, as well as how to avoid and resist paying bribes.
The mission, it should be emphasized, is not to kick any particular politician or bureaucrat
out of office for malfeasance. Rather, IPAB consciously positions itself as a facilitator,
helping to amplify the voice of citizens to highlight systemic patterns of corruption and
improve governance. As stated on the website, its mission is to “work with citizens and
the government to improve the quality of life in Indian cities and towns.”
The focus on public education is apparent on the website. There is an online
Q&A session (“Ask Raghu”) where users can seek advice from a former senior civil
servant. By May 2012, Raghu had answered over 1,050 questions. Another section on
“Experts Speak” posted articles on corruption by experts. A “how to” section explains
legal facts and documents on mundane but practical matters encountered by regular
citizens, such as “how to procure a working permit in India” and “how to get customs
clearance of import shipment without paying bribe.”
The Janaagraha Centre has the explicit goal of working closely with the government
to change administrative processes, with the aim of minimizing opportunities for bribery.
One of its most well-known sets of policy recommendations was a report of nearly
forty pages addressed to the Transport Department.16 The report summarizes patterns23
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official fee schedule of each procedure, and legal requirements for obtaining a permit
or service. For each step in the process, readers are alerted to “bribe prone zones”; for
example in obtaining a learner’s license, readers are warned that “agents set shop
outside office disguised as Xerox shops and offer to get work done for a price.”
Drawing on citizens’ reports, the Centre recommended a list of concrete measures
to the Transport Department to reduce opportunities of bribe-taking. It is worth
noting that their recommendations were not vacuous statements to “do the right
thing,” but were practicable and grounded in citizens’ input. For example, it recom-
mended replacing manual driving tests with simulator tests, requiring employees
of the department to wear identity badges, and creating a single-window system.
It also recommended medium-term reforms to remove the region-specific nature of
Transport offices, introducing competition to improve the delivery of services.
In another success case, IPAB changed processes in land registration. Traditionally,
to register the purchase and sale of land, Indian citizens had to obtain approval from a
regional land registration office where the particular land parcel was located. Reports
from citizens indicated that bribery was higher in offices on the periphery of the city
than those in the city, as the periphery experienced a concentration of new growth.
The finding prompted the Janaagraha Centre to propose to the Department of Stamps
and Registration to allow citizens to register land transactions in any regional office.
As indicated on the website, “It took several months of advocacy, and we got it—and
rates for land transactions have come down since then.”17
Importantly, the constructive role of IPAB in fighting corruption has been endorsed
by a number of high-ranking government officials. One of the keenest supporters was the
Transportation Commissioner of Bangalore, Mr. Bhaskar Rao. The Janaagraha Centre
worked with the Commissioner and his senior management to reengineer the process flow
of issuing drivers’ licenses and converted two steps to automated tests, thereby reducing
bureaucratic discretion. More recently, the Chief Secretary of the State, the highest-
ranking bureaucrat, sought the Center’s support in doing more to fight corruption.18
As news about IPAB spread, the site captured international attention and acclaim.
The website was featured as a success story in major news media, including the New York
Times, The Economist, BCC News, and the Anti-Corruption Research Network (a global
online platform on corruption research). The Harvard Business School featured IPAB
as a case study in its instructional series.19 The founders saw “international franchising”
as a way of sustaining IPAB and extending its influence globally.20 Versions of the
website have diffused to seventeen other countries, including Bhutan, Pakistan, and
Kenya.21 In June 2011, IPAB was brought to the attention of Chinese netizens.The Birth and Death of IPAB in China
IPAB was first introduced to China by a press report. Immediately following the report,
netizens responded with a frenzy of interest and hope for change. A wave of spin-offs
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process lasted only a summer, it can be divided into five stages:
1. Initial wave of emergence
2. Proliferation and surging popularity
3. First wave of shutdown
4. Approval and re-launch
5. Second wave of shutdown
Based on a collection of media reports, I trace each of these stages, focusing on
the life cycle of one of four sites that had gained official, albeit short-lived, registration
approval: www.woxinghuile.com. One data caveat that needs to be acknowledged is
that by the time this subject came to my attention, it was already at its terminal stage.
All the sites had disappeared, so I do not have access to the original content of the
sites. Thus, I draw on secondary reports and remnants from woxinghuile to trace
the birth and death of I-paid-a-bribe in China.22
Initial Wave of Emergence The first spark was lit on June 8. Beijing News ran
a full-page feature on IPAB in India.23 The article stoked popular interests by
highlighting two points: that the website “projected people’s power” and that the
Transport Commissioner “became one of the most loyal fans” of the initiative. On
the same day, the original article in Beijing News was reprinted in other news
outlets. Within days, spin-off versions of the Indian prototype sprang up across
cyberspace. Woxinghuile was created on June 9, only a day after the report on Beijing
News. On June 12, Xinhua press ran a report on the emergence of a string of copycat
sites and identified three major I-paid-a-bribe websites, including woxinghuile,
woxinghuila, and wohuiluole.24 Below are screenshots of India’s I-paid-a-bribe and
China’s woxinghuile respectively.Figure 1 I-Paid-a-Bribe in India versus China
Screenshot of I-Paid-A-Bribe in India Screenshot of woxinghuile in China
25
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from mid to late June. It remains unclear how many of these websites were created
during that time. Some said twenty-five, others claimed as many as sixty. They were
difficult to count and track because whereas there is only one website in India with a
clearly-defined identity and format, spin-off websites in China took myriad forms.
While some looked almost exactly like the Indian version, others bore little resem-
blance. Some sites merely added a section for posting bribe-giving stories on existing
forums and platforms. Most IPAB websites found themselves unexpectedly popular.
Woxinghuile reported that within days of operation, it had as many as 50,000 visitors
a day, with over 8,000 posts.25 The site’s traffic was so overloaded that it broke
down intermittently.
First Wave of Shutdowns The first wave of crackdowns began in mid- to late
June. On the fifth day of its operation, around mid-June, woxinghuile was abruptly
shut down. To keep the site running, the webmaster shifted his server between
Hong Kong and China and used a temporary IP address. When asked if he thought
the government would shut down his site, the webmaster of woxinghuile expressed
optimism. In a press interview on June 12 with Xinhua, he said: “I believe the
government will support us. Anti-corruption is a need of the party and the people.
If India’s Transportation Minister can become a fan of I-paid-a-bribe, then why
can’t the Chinese people’s fight against corruption thrive openly?”26
The webmaster’s hopes turned out to be too optimistic. On June 20, in a press
interview, the anti-corruption bureau and procuratorate chiefs in Beijing expressed
concerns and disapproval, but not explicit prohibition, of IPAB sites.27 They noted
that these websites could invite false postings and defamation, and could also dis-
rupt existing investigations on corruption if they alerted suspects to charges. Finally,
they added that there were already official channels for sending tip-offs to the
government. In the words of the officials, the online platforms were “not serious.”
During that period, the press media began to question if IPAB would last.28 Reports
appeared on various problems that emerged on the IPAB forums, such as false
information and profiteering.
Approval and Relaunch By late June, there was a surprising burst of renewed
hope. The government, specifically the Ministry of Information & Communications,
approved the registration of four IPAB websites, including woxinghuile. The
webmaster expressed surprise at the approval. Yet, following state approval, popu-
larity of the websites declined dramatically. On August 4, reporters who accessed
one of the websites found that the maximum number of visits over three days,
following approval, reached only 2,975 and had less than 5,000 postings, a far
cry from the first week of operation.29 By this time, the webmasters responded
to state concerns by tweaking slogans to sound less confrontational and deleted
“tip-offs” that identified individuals. However, users found it less thrilling and
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Even before the state’s decision to close the sites, the IPAB fervor had already
lost steam.
A Second and Final Wave of Shutdowns By early August, for reasons not explained
to the public, a second and final wave of shutdowns began. Registration approvals
were abruptly revoked. On August 8, the webmaster of woxinghuile posted a message
on his blog, saying that he would strive to maintain the site. He even offered to
“donate” the site to the government in the hope of keeping it alive.30 However, the
next day, he was informed by the government that the site had lost its approval.
Oddly enough, on the same day, China Daily ran an article titled “Bribery websites
up and running.”31
By the time I checked the sites in late August of 2011 and more recently, virtually
all of the major reported sites no longer existed. The few remaining ones posted only
news articles but not personal encounters, thus essentially abandoning the model
of IPAB. After August, no more articles about IPAB appeared in the state media.
The issue was entirely dropped from public discourse. In sum, within a period of
two months, IPAB emerged with a bang and then went on a roller-coaster ride from
huge popularity, state approval, and eventually to closure. Table 1 summarizes the
brief life-cycle of Chinese-style IPAB.Table 1 The Life and Death of “I-Paid-A-Bribe” (IPAB) Websites in ChinaEmergence Mid-June
2011IPAB websites emerged in China. News reports of the websites
immediately followed, including official media like Xinhua
and China Daily. Most of the websites were inspired by the
Indian IPAB website. A few were pre-existing forums that
added sections on bribery/corruption exposure.Proliferation Mid to late
June 2011Over 50 websites were reported to have followed, but most
were small in scale and lesser known.First
ShutdownLate June
2011Most small forums were shut down. Four bigger ones that later
gained official approvals survived but were unstable.Approval Late June to
mid July
2011First approval dates back to 6/24/11 and was granted to
woxinghuile. Another three were subsequently granted official
approval.Decline Mid July
2011 onwardsWebsites that still survived saw a drastic decline of posts and
visits. Majority of posts on websites still available were
concentrated in mid-June.Final
ShutdownEarly Aug
2011Official approvals were revoked without explicit reasons.
Almost all websites are inaccessible both in and outside China.
News articles about the websites also seemed to stop around
this time. No new reports can be found after mid-August.Shaky
Comeback?December
2011Fanxinghui, which first emerged in mid June, was accessible
intermittently around early December. Nonetheless, no new
posts were found on the website after July. By mid-December,
the website was closed down again.27
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Narratives in the earlier sections illustrate that whereas IPAB originated and thrived
in India, a bottom-up copycat effort in China fizzled out within months of emergence.
In making sense of China’s outcome, “success” in India and “failure” in China needs
to be qualified. My outcome of interest is on the sustainability of IPAB. In addition to
the fact that IPAB still exists in India, we see a constructive pattern of civic engage-
ment between state and society. India’s IPAB works with state authorities to channel
crowd-sourcing inputs into process change, provides public education on resisting
bribery, and has even become an international model for other countries. Failure in
China manifests not only in the quick disappearance of IPAB sites, but also in the initia-
tive’s double failure to engage government or maintain public credibility and interests.
To be clear, then, “success” in India and “failure” in China should not be con-
strued as meaning that IPAB eradicated bribery in India but failed to do so in China.
On the whole, it appears that India has a more pervasive problem of petty bribery
than China.32 Although some recommendations by IPAB were successfully introduced
in India, they have not—and should not realistically be expected to—eradicate corrup-
tion. There are numerous factors that go into explaining why petty bribery is hard to
root out in India. My outcome of interest is not on differing levels of corruption in the
two countries, which is outside the scope of this analysis.33 Instead, I ask: given the
same crowd-sourcing platform, how do we account for a much shorter length of sur-
vival and a qualitatively different pattern of participation in China, compared to India?
Figure 2 below maps out my explanatory approach in contrast to the conven-
tional view. For many, the intuitive answer to the failure of IPAB in China is
authoritarian intolerance of corruption reports and repression. However, my analysis
will modify the conventional view in two respects. First, although Chinese authori-
ties did in the end decided to close IPAB sites, their responses wavered and were
fragmented in the weeks leading up to a final decision. Second, in addition to employ-
ing measures of direct suppression, I argue that authoritarian rule indirectly debilitates
the organizational roots of online activism. Prolonged restrictions against autono-
mous NGOs and free association present the underlying conditions for organizational
problems that emerged in the wave of IPAB sites (to be detailed in the next section).
Resultantly, the initiative quickly lost public credibility and user enthusiasm, and
authorities justified the need to step in as regulators. China’s IPAB began to crumble
even before the state officially denied registration to the sites.The State’s Wavering Response toward IPAB
Not all authorities in China viewed IPAB as threatening. For central authorities, IPAB
was a double-edged sword.34 On the one hand, engaging citizens to report petty bribery
can be a useful way to collect information and control low-level agents.35 On the other
hand, IPAB could amplify anger over corruption and undermine state legitimacy.
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Central officials appeared more supportive of IPAB, as postings were local and petty
in nature and unlikely to reveal grand corruption at the highest level. He Quoqiang,
Head of the Central Discipline Committee, spoke approvingly about the role of the
internet in fighting corruption.36 In March 2011, the Chief of the Central News and
Publications Office and the Chief of Intellectual Property Rights Office expressed
that the internet can be a positive platform for reflecting public opinion. However,
local officials were likely to find IPAB sites threatening, as they could be personally
implicated. In a Northeastern city, two IPAB sites that revealed corruption in the
area where they were based were charged with “extortion” by local authorities,
and the organizers were jailed.37
There also appeared to be divisions across central ministries, which could explain
why four websites were approved in late June but revoked weeks later. Without access
to central-level bureaucrats, who are very difficult, if not impossible, to interview on this
subject, there are few clues about the internal bargaining and decision-making pro-
cesses. However, we know that whereas the Ministry of Information & Communica-
tions revoked the license, the Central Discipline Committee, as quoted above, seemed
more tolerant of IPAB portals. Furthermore, ministerial decisions and reports in the
state media were sometimes inconsistent. For instance, on the day that woxinghuile
lost its approval, China Daily reported that the websites were “up and running.”
The process traced is consistent with the imagery of “fragmented authoritarianism.”
As Lieberthal pointed out, “Authority below the very peak of the Chinese political
system is fragmented and disjointed.”38 Mertha adds that fragmented authoritari-
anism has been complicated in the recent decade by “an increasing number of non-
traditional—and non-state—policy entrepreneurs,” including, in this case, online activists
and netizens.39 Different levels and parts of the party-state engage civil society differently,
depending on whether the work of the groups serves their needs and agendas.40
However, for the state, the decision to bar IPAB sites from registration does not
mean the end of crowd-sourcing techniques in exposing corruption. In April 2013,
central authorities announced the creation of “online informant” web-pages on major
news sites that solicited tip-offs on corruption. It was said that these state-run plat-
forms would “help people report corruption in an orderly and legitimate manner.”41
This is further evidence that Chinese authorities are not necessarily against having
citizens snitch on corruption—the key is that they want these reports to be collected
and processed by them, and not by independent non-government actors.Internal Organizational Problems in China’s IPAB
Having documented the state’s fragmented and wavering response to IPAB, this
section moves to examine the operation and use of IPAB in the online community.
I will discuss five main organizational problems that emerged in China’s IPAB, com-
paring each with the case of India. A side-by-side comparison usefully shows that
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IPAB can be compared to a standing army and China’s to guerilla fighters. Whereas
NGOs in India can openly exist and direct civic efforts toward a constructive cause,
online activists in China fight constantly in “guerilla warfare” to circumvent and dodge
state controls.42 However, as we will see, the dispersed structure and guerilla tactics
that allow Chinese netizens to survive in a hostile authoritarian environment also make
it difficult for them to self-govern effectively, professionalize, and engage the state
on a long-term agenda.
Absence of Consolidation and Professional Management IPAB in India is a
single website established by an NGO, the Janaagraha Centre. The co-founders of
the Janaagraha Centre are Ramesh and Swati Ramanathan. Both received graduate
education in the United States. Ramesh Ramanathan received an MBA from Yale
and was chosen as a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum, while
Swati Ramanathan was elected as a Young Asian Leader by the Asia Society. Work-
ing with the founders are sixteen other managers and professional staff members.43
The Janaagraha Centre can exist and thrive in India not only because India is a
democracy that allows free association, but also because India has a highly educated
group of young people, like the Ramanathans, willing to take on social causes.
In contrast, China could never tolerate an autonomous NGO with the stated mis-
sion of checking the government and recommending administrative reforms. In the
absence of a lead organization, we see a variety of spin-off sites, none of which were
professionally funded and managed. Many of the IPAB webmasters hid their iden-
tities and used online pseudonyms. The webmasters were not professionals but rather
individuals who ran the sites out of personal interest and occasionally even for
monetary gain. Keeping their identities secret was a necessary “guerilla” tactic used
by webmasters to avoid state censorship and control. While the absence of a con-
solidated effort makes it difficult for censoring authorities to shut down all the sites,
it was a precursor to down-stream organizational fissures.
Narrow Goals of Anti-Corruption as Punishing “Bad” Officials In any associa-
tional effort, whether an NGO or an online platform, formulating and articulating
the mission is central to the organization’s value and success. In China, the absence
of consolidated and professional management had a direct impact on the value of
the reports collected and the type of online participation observed. IPAB in India, on
the other hand, serves a clearly articulated goal of fighting corruption as a systemic,
rather than individual, problem. As stated on the website, “Our intent is to change
the system that breeds corruption, rather than indict the individuals within the system.
Besides, you change the individuals, the threat of corruption remains. But change
the system and you root out corruption permanently.”44
It appears that webmasters in China either missed or misunderstood the core
objective of India’s IPAB to fight systemic corruption. Instead, their focus was on
exposing and punishing “bad” officials. Organizers saw themselves as a platform31
Comparative Politics October 2014for tip-offs or even as an extension of state investigative authorities. One webmaster
said he hoped his site could, “like India’s IPAB, catch a few corrupt officials or
at least place them on the alert.”45 Some webmasters turned IPAB into private inves-
tigation businesses. Others proposed to link their sites to the press media, so that
exposés could be elevated to public attention and corrupt officials swiftly deposed.46
None mentioned or noted the success of the Indian case in advocating concrete insti-
tutional changes like the ones earlier described, such as by changing the way land
registration is done.
We also do not see a conscious effort at providing public education in China’s
IPAB sites. The Indian site works to inform the public about their rights to access
public services without having to pay a bribe, track bribery patterns, warn about
“bribe-prone zones,” and spread requisite legal knowledge to understand rights and
resist bribery. The objective of public education, which was central to the Indian site,
was lost in China. In fact, the whole idea that non-governmental entities should and
can educate the public is alien to Chinese society. Education, particularly in political
matters pertaining to rights and the rule of law, can only be done by the state.
The apparent obsession with punishing bad officials reflects the larger political
environment. In fighting corruption, the CCP has long relied on periodic campaigns
to purge individuals.47 During the most recent 18th Party Congress, the new leaders
acknowledged that corruption is a serious problem, which led to a whirlwind of
anti-corruption campaigns and arrests, proudly advertised in the press media.48 The
ruling party consciously avoids discussing the systematic causes of corruption,49 how-
ever, as these discussions would ultimately point to the vast concentration of power in
a single party as the primary cause. Given that the problem of corruption strikes at the
heart of legitimacy in the CCP-controlled state, corruption is treated with far more
trepidation by authorities in China than in India.
Postings Not Guided for Policy or Educational Purposes India’s IPAB was
designed to collect data for public education and to inform policies. Thus, the site pro-
vides a template for citizens to report incidents of bribe giving, of resisting to give
a bribe, and encounters with honest officials. Before writing and submitting their
stories, users are asked to provide details regarding the bribe, including the city, the
date, and the amount. Viewers can see a daily updated summary of citizens’ reports
by category (urban, rural, medical), city, department, and bribe amount.
Contrastingly, in China, there was little conscious effort to translate the reported
stories into policy recommendations. Instead, there were sites of various shapes and
formats. Even woxinghuile, one of the four major sites, did not provide a template
for entries. This omission signals that the webmaster had no plan to collate the reports
to track corruption patterns. The site simply provided a platform to tell stories. The
Chinese sites, furthermore, did not provide expert or legal guidance on what consti-
tuted a bribe, unlike in the Indian case.
As a result, IPAB reports in China were a dizzying mess. Some were valid reports
of bribery, but others reported acts that did not necessarily constitute bribery, such
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sion into top-ranked schools.50 There were also self reports of bribe-taking, though
their veracity is doubtful. Below are posts scavenged from woxinghuile, written in
exaggerated and inflammatory language:51Village elections are so dark!!!!!! For example, during the last village election, in
my hometown in Zhongshan city of Guangdong province, vote-buying was extremely
serious. All the villages are like that. In some villages one vote costs a few thousand
Yuan. Votes for a few hundred Yuan are common. Everyone knows this. Everyone
is willing to take money and vote! Some even say with each round of elections, I can
earn a few thousand Yuan!!! This is extremely common!
For birth certificates, particularly birth certificates for a second child, [you have
to pay] 800 to 3,000 Yuan. Why are the prices not the same? Because it
depends on your relationship [with the authorities]. Depends on the targets of
the cadres. Depends on whether you are desperate!!!!! They know how to manipu-
late the situation.
I am the principal of a key-point public school in Suixi (of Anhui Province). Four years
ago, I spent 100,000 Yuan to buy my current position—you have no evidence against
me, so it’s not against the law. After I bought my position, those who needed my favors
had to pay me 3,000 to 5,000 Yuan each. Ha ha! I am the first pot of gold since
I came to office. During the holidays, whoever fails to present me gifts will have
to scram!A Chinese webmaster conceded that he was disappointed by the content of the posts,
as “most are just used to vent personal anger.”52 Indeed, the content of the posts
reflects a social phenomenon in China known as “the mass mentality of hating offi-
cials” (chouguan xintai). With hatred as a key motivator for IPAB participation in
China, there is little hope that the platform, even if it had not been shut down, could
have delivered the process change and public education seen in India.
False Information, Libel, and Personal Revenge False postings, libel, and personal
vengeance were other pernicious problems in China. Without a guiding mission and
template, it was not uncommon that Chinese users specified the actual location,
person, and department of the bribe incident when reporting their encounters on
IPAB.53 In fact, from the little content salvaged from woxinghuile, I found entries
that identified names, even cell phone numbers, from users angry at bribe-taking
officials who failed to deliver promises.Between July and October 2010. Hunan Province, Changde City, Commerce Bureau.
I bribed the station chief and vice-chief. Their surnames were Fu and Wen respec-
tively. I am a university student who wanted to start my own business, but I didn’t
have a license for two months, so they gave me trouble and wanted to fine me
3000 Yuan. They threw out a bunch of big theories; what national law; what spirit
of the document; what auditing. Then I gave them two packs of the best-quality
cigarettes (300 Yuan each) and 500 Yuan in cash.33
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34In the Hongshan district of Wuhan City, Wang [first name] of the Real Estate Office
took a pack of cigarettes from me, costing 400 Yuan. After he accepted the cigarettes,
he did not deliver what he promised. I don’t know if I can get this thing publicized.
This bastard only knows how to talk and does nothing. Some netizens say I am a
fake and that I gave too little. I only make 1,200 Yuan a month. 400 Yuan of ciga-
rettes is a lot to me. I announce his cell phone number so you can call and verify his
identity: [cell phone number].In comparison, India’s IPAB preempts the potential of false information and libel
in several ways. From the beginning, the site made clear that its goal of collecting
citizens’ input was to combat systemic corruption and not to punish individuals. The
Center installed software that automatically deletes the names of individuals. The site
also hired a moderator whose job is to delete defamatory reports. Most importantly,
although false postings could certainly happen in India, the anonymity of reports
reduces incentives for falsification. As explained, “By not allowing names to be pub-
lished, we have eliminated any incentive for any individual to make a false or malicious
complaint. Since nobody will gain anything by reporting a false complaint on our site
because we do not act on complaint, we expect the stories on the site to be true.”54
Lack of Funding and Opportunism Last but not least, one finds in China allega-
tions of opportunism and even bribe-taking among IPAB organizers, which is con-
nected to the lack of open and sustainable sources of funding. The Janaagraha
Centre is funded by individual and institutional donors, including charitable founda-
tions, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and companies like Dell
and Google. The annual financial reports are posted online for public view. Financial
transparency ensures sponsors of the proper use of funds, which contributes to the
site’s sustainability. In contrast, the spin-off sites in China were largely self-funded
by individual webmasters, who lacked formal fund-raising strategies. One organizer
claimed to have spent about 10,000 Yuan of his own funds to start a site. Wohuiluole,
another major site, survived on cash donations from a group of thirty netizens. The
webmaster expressed hope that the site could rely entirely on donations by netizens.
Another webmaster hoped to receive financial support from foreign foundations.
Facing financial pressures, online organizers were compelled to ask for posting fees
or use netizens’ reports to generate popularity for advertising revenue.55
Financially constrained or eager to profit, some webmasters in China attempted
to generate revenue by offering to investigate and verify citizens’ reports. The IPAB
wave inspired the term “outsourcing tip-offs”: i.e., netizens could “outsource” their
“tip-offs” to webmasters by paying fees to have reports verified, elevated to public
attention, and, finally, to have opponents or corrupt officials who fail to deliver
promises arrested. One of them, named Lu, argued that if a webmaster or organizer
undertook the task of checking reports for veracity, then it was only right for users to
pay his salary and travel expenses. He said, “Although this is not legal, this is reasonable.
After all, even though anti-corruption activists like us are righteous in our hearts, our
stomachs protest!” Webmaster Lu added that he would charge no more than 3,000 Yuan
Yuen Yuen Angto investigate and verify each report. Another site, mingjizaixian, announced its fee-
based services on the homepage: “You will have to pre-pay my travel expenses and
stipend. Upon arrival at the investigation site, all expenses will be borne by the user
[i.e. whoever posted a corruption story and sought to have it verified].”56
Even worse, there were allegations that some IPAB organizers extracted bribes to
delete posts on bribe-giving. One webmaster lamented that there were “opportunists”
among them who “hung the heads of lambs but sold dog meat.”57 Attempts to profit from
IPAB or even extract bribes through the initiative are unthinkable in India, where
associations are open, bound by norms and laws, and held publicly accountable. In fact,
problems of and opportunism in China are not limited to IPAB or online organizers.
Among journalists, allegations of corruption, bribes, and blackmail abound as well.58Conclusion
By comparing state and social responses to IPAB in China and India, this study
modifies two prevailing sets of knowledge about the limits of online activism—and
more broadly, civil society—in authoritarian regimes. First, I shift attention away from
the conventional focus of authoritarian restraints in the form of repression, cooptation,
and inducement of self-control toward the indirect debilitation of civil society.59 In the
area of online activism, censorship and arrests are obvious restraints imposed by the
state. Less obvious, however, are the extended effects of authoritarian rule in keeping
NGOs from professionalizing and citizens from learning to self-govern. Some previous
studies have documented the dysfunctional aspects of civil society in authoritarian
settings.60 However, I go further to stress that the challenges to self-organization
and constructive civic engagement are exacerbated in online platforms. Although bar-
riers to participation are lowered, there is less commitment among those who join, and
anonymous participants are not able to police one another.61 The result is a vicious
cycle. The more an authoritarian state controls, the more civil society is incapacitated;
and when collective civic efforts falter, state authorities are compelled to step in and
exert more control.
Second, I caution against sanguine images of activists and netizens in authori-
tarian societies as crusaders against oppressive controls, images that assume liberal-
democratic qualities among participants of online activism. Certainly, the Internet
and social media have liberalized political discourse in China, allowing regular citi-
zens to obtain information and to challenge the state more freely than through tra-
ditional forums;62 however, if we peer deeper, we find a darker side to the world of
netizens, including the presence of opportunistic individuals, intolerance of divergent
opinions, and a deep social hatred for officialdom that is prone to radicalization.63
One editorial insightfully notes:With the rapid uptake of social media, Mainland Chinese are becoming increas-
ingly outspoken when it comes to politics, at least online. …Unfortunately … we have35
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36witnessed a rising tide of radical political viewpoints, expressed often in little more
than verbal abuse. These kinds of activists, when faced with a well-informed oppo-
nent, even resort to physical violence. … On the Internet, detractors of the govern-
ment become “traitors” who should be “persecuted,” while its supporters are mocked
as “patriotraitors” or “running dogs of the government.”… As each camp claims to
be right, they refute the right of their opponents to exist.64Admittedly, extremism may appear in any society, but in China, at least, narrow
notions of corruption and vitriolic speech, as well as attempts to “purge” individuals
via the Internet, uncannily reflect political moves and discourses practiced by the
ruling elites.65 Ironically, as much as they do criticize the government, Chinese neti-
zens are deeply influenced by the political climate to which they are accustomed.
My study also informs a broader set of debates about the political effects of
new media on mobilizing contention and enforcing bureaucratic accountability. Some
argue that the spread of new media empowers collective action and may even trigger
democratization in authoritarian regimes.66 Events in the Arab Spring were cited as
prime examples.67 Yet, others are more skeptical.68 I argue for a tempered view that
takes into account the role of civic associations in channeling online activism and
the sustainability of contentious agendas. Online political participation offers the
advantages of accessibility and anonymity, producing a dynamic of contention differ-
ent from face-to-face modes of contention between state and social actors.69 In one
prominent example, the “PX incident,” residents of Kunming City used social media
platforms and text messaging to organize protests against a refinery project. Sporadic
successes like these project an image of new media’s revolutionary power. New
technologies of communication, however, do not replace or make obsolete the role
of civic associations in directing social inputs toward constructive causes, as the
organizational problems and swift demise of IPAB in China clearly show. My
analysis further underscores the formidable organizational challenges that are faced
when masses of anonymous netizens attempt to pursue a long-term agenda of insti-
tutional change.
Optimism that online activism can effectively keep corrupt officials in check
needs to also be tempered. In recent years, there have been several prominent cases
in which netizens succeeded in deposing corrupt officials by posting exposés on the
Internet. The central disciplinary committee has also set up websites to elicit tip-offs
from citizens. These incidents project the impression that netizens can constrain offi-
cial power by means of whistle-blowing. However, the role of online activism in
anti-corruption remains haphazard. Even with new media added, anti-corruption con-
tinues to be a game of whack-a-mole: after one “unlucky” official is exposed, another
one soon takes his place. Exposés may successfully lead to arrests and the replace-
ment of individual officials, but they cannot systematically motivate institutional or
procedural changes.
Even more importantly, for online exposés to effectively check government
abuses, clearly stipulated rules of bureaucratic accountability must be put into place
(i.e. rules that stipulate what public officials can and cannot do). In China, these
Yuen Yuen Angrules are still not clearly articulated or enforced.70 Officials often stumble over com-
plicated and even conflicting goals imposed by higher levels of the government.71
Furthermore, negative exposure on the Internet can get officials fired, whether or
not they are proven guilty of crimes or dereliction of duty.72 Thus, although the rise
of online activism puts Chinese officials on the alert,73 it may actually encourage
a perverse form of accountability, where officials are punished for both correct and
random reasons. Such a political environment creates tremendous uncertainty for
bureaucratic operations and cripples governance at the grassroots level.74
While it is heartening that Chinese netizens are increasingly emboldened to
expose corruption and challenge state discourse, the revolutionary potential of new
media has to be viewed with healthy skepticism. New media may lower the barriers
to political participation, but a weak civil society, with new media added, is still
weak. New media may encourage whistle-blowing, but sporadic anti-corruption cam-
paigns that ignore the root causes of systemic corruption, even with new media
added, are still haphazard. Building civic empowerment requires more than kicking
corrupt officials out of office. More fundamentally, it requires cultivating autonomous
NGOs and civic values, freeing political debate from state censorship and vicious
attacks from fellow citizens, and creating clear legal rules of bureaucratic account-
ability. Beneath the straitjacket of overt controls, these are the deeper challenges that
call for serious attention.
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